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020 _a9780691090108
028 _aInternational Book Distributors
_b;Flat No.17,Prakash Apartments ,5 Ansari Road,DaryaGanj,New Delhi-110002
_c;112529
_d;20/07/2018
082 _a337 POM
100 _aKenneth Pomeranz
245 _aThe great divergence
_b : China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy
_c/Kenneth Pomeranz
260 _aPrinceton, N.J.
_b: Princeton University Press
_c, ©2000.
300 _ax, 382 pages
_b: illustrations
_c; 24 cm.
490 _aPrinceton economic history of the Western world.
505 _a Comparisons, connections, and narratives of European economic development -- A World of Surprising Resemblances. Europe before Asia? Population, capital accumulation, and technology in explanations of European development -- Market economies in Europe and Asia -- From New Ethos to New Economy? Consumption, Investment, and Capitalism. Luxury consumption and the rise of capitalism -- Visible hands: firm structure, sociopolitical structure, and "capitalism" in Europe and Asia -- Beyond Smith and Malthus: From Ecological Constraints to Sustained Industrial Growth. Shared constraints: ecological strain in Western Europe and East Asia -- Abolishing the land constraint: the Americas as a new kind of periphery.
520 _a This text offers insight into one of the classic questions of history: why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As the author shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, he demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade. The author argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths. Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia's economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths, paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas.
650 _aSocial Science
655 _aComparative economics
_bEconomic history
700 _aKenneth Pomeranz
942 _cBOOK
999 _c49939
_d49939