000 02952nam a22002297a 4500
999 _c56639
_d56639
005 20210802122414.0
008 200707b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 _a9783110595154
028 _aBrijwasi Book Distributors
_b;H-87,Lalita Park,Laxmi Nagar,Delhi-110092
_c;BW/005820
_d;01/06/2020
082 _a519.3 FRA
100 _aGabriel Frahm
245 _aRational choice and strategic conflict
_b: the subjectivistic approach to game and decision theory
_c/Gabriel Frahm
260 _aBoston ; Wien
_b: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
_c, 2019
300 _axv, 340 Pages
_c;26 cm.
365 _b7086
505 _a Frontmatter -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part I: Rational Choice -- 1. The Subjectivistic Approach to Rational Choice -- 2. How the Subjectivistic Approach Works -- Part II: Strategic Conflict -- 3. The Subjectivistic Approach to Strategic Conflict -- 4. Action -- 5. Reaction -- 6. Interaction -- Part III: Alternative Concepts of Game Theory -- 7. The Traditional Approach -- 8. The Epistemic Approach -- 9. Theory of Moves -- Bibliography -- Games -- Index
520 _aThis book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go--and, in fact, must go--hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary--the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University).
650 _aMathematics
655 _aGame theory.
700 _aGabriel Frahm
942 _cBOOK